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Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama (1968) was arguably the first systematic analysis of 
the role of institutions in Asia’s development. Myrdal described his magisterial 
work as an ‘institutional approach’ that aimed to explain why conventional eco-
nomic analysis was providing inappropriate policy advice. Economic policies that 
worked in advanced countries were failing in Asia, Myrdal argued, because of 
Asian behavioural norms.1 Conventional economics assumed that people would 
respond flexibly and rationally to market incentives, but social, institutional, and 
political factors made Asians respond in different ways.
Like Myrdal, later institutional economists such as North (1990) or Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012) began to explain the poor performance of some developing 
countries by comparing their market-supporting institutions and informal norms 
with advanced countries. But like Myrdal, they ignored the Asian countries that 
performed remarkably well with unorthodox institutions, and they did not ask 
why similar unorthodox institutions failed to work in other Asian countries. The 
new institutional analysis failed to explain these variations because, first, it focused 
only on an analysis of institutions, both formal and informal, ignoring how char-
acteristics of organizations and the distribution of power between them affected 
the operation of institutions and the persistence or otherwise of particular behav-
ioural patterns. Second, they also downplayed the critical role of institutions in 
responding to market failures. Later developmental state theorists did focus on 
institutions that addressed market failures, in particular, industrial policy institu-
tions. But they, too, ignored the role of power in explaining the effectiveness of 
these institutions. The ‘political settlements framework’ looks at the interdepend-
ence of institutions and organizations, and how the distribution of power across 
organizations affects the effectiveness of institutions and the persistence of 
particular types of informal behaviour. This framework can explain the diversity 
of Asian experiences better and can help to formulate more effective policy.
1 Myrdal’s work takes in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, with occasional references to South Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. However, his in-depth 
analysis is largely based on India and to a lesser extent Pakistan, with references to other countries 
supporting the main lines of argument.
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One of Myrdal’s most influential observations was that states in South Asia 
were ‘soft’ and could not enforce social discipline. Political leaders tolerated social 
indiscipline and inefficiency on the grounds that this was part of ‘democratic 
planning’ while engaging in corruption themselves. Myrdal argued that this 
regressive collective behaviour was the product of attitudes, cultures, and insti-
tutions. He was describing something important, but it was an incomplete 
observation. The soft states were only ‘soft’ in some areas. They were very hard in 
others, for instance in repressing communists or secessionists. The weak imple-
mentation of some institutions and policies is more likely to have been due to the 
interests of powerful organizations in specific countries and sectors rather than a 
general feature of their cultures and attitudes. The ‘political settlement’ describes 
the distribution of power across different types of organizations. The distribution 
of organizational power can vary greatly across countries and sectors, and over 
time, and can help to explain significant differences in institutional outcomes and 
behavioural patterns.
The relationship between institutions and political settlements can be explored 
through the lens of industrial policy institutions, which played an important role 
in many Asian countries. Success with industrialization depended not just on 
the country’s initial conditions, but also on the implementation of transformative 
industrial policy institutions. Successful industrial policy in Taiwan and South 
Korea in the 1950s and 1960s involved the allocation of resources to new firms and 
sectors as conditional policy rents. The aim was to accelerate technology adoption 
and learning-by-doing to raise productivity and achieve competitiveness in new 
sectors. The critical condition for success, as developmental state theorists later 
pointed out, was that industrial policy agencies could effectively discipline the 
recipients of policy rents. This capability allowed mistakes to be corrected and 
ensured that productivity growth was rapid. In China in the 1980s, the industrial 
policy was different but the enforcement of conditions ensuring productivity 
growth was again effective, achieving dramatic outcomes.
At the other end of the spectrum were countries in South Asia in the 1960s 
where the beneficiaries of industrial policy rents were much more difficult to 
 discipline. Powerfully connected business houses, and groups linked to them, 
captured policy rents and could not be disciplined. Not surprisingly, these coun-
tries achieved less significant industrial outcomes. Southeast Asian countries 
were somewhere in between and achieved moderate success. However, the 1980s 
saw the beginning of a different type of industrialization in South Asia, led by 
sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals in India and garments and textiles 
in Bangladesh. Institutions and policies successfully supported capability devel-
opment in these sectors because policy rents were now delivered in ways that 
could not be unproductively captured, even in these political settlements.
Developmental state institutions worked in North East Asia and China not 
because these countries already had market-supporting behavioural norms, nor 
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because they were less corrupt or otherwise better at following market rules. If the 
appropriate rights, norms, and behaviour already existed, social transformations 
would not be required (Khan 2004, 2007). Transformational policies are required 
precisely because pre-existing rights and institutions have to change and new 
capabilities developed. They inevitably disrupt pre-existing rights and require the 
creation of many rents as important market failures are targeted. Transformational 
institutions are successful when they are effective in changing rights and behav-
iour to achieve more productive societies. For this to happen the enforcement of 
these institutions has to be aligned with the interests of the powerful.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines Myrdal’s contribution 
to institutional analysis and how modern institutional analysis has built on his 
analysis. Section 3 sets out an alternative institutional analysis based on political 
settlements, and the implications for the analysis of the effectiveness of institutions. 
Section 4 draws on the experiences of Asian countries to explore how develop-
mental policies and institutions worked across political settlements and how appro-
priately designed transformative institutions can work even in apparently adverse 
political settlements. Section 5 concludes by discussing incremental versus radical 
strategies for reforming governance and institutions. While Myrdal advocated 
radical change, he recognized, with some pessimism, that the incremental approach 
was the one that most countries would adopt. However, a deeper evaluation of the 
experiences of the last fifty years suggests that the incremental approach can have 
less pessimistic prospects than Myrdal thought, particularly if it takes into 
account the interdependencies between organizational power and institutions.
2. Myrdal and Institutional Analysis
Myrdal posed a question that continues to motivate institutional analysis: why do 
people not respond to incentives in the same way everywhere (Myrdal  1968: 
16–24)? Myrdal rightly criticized economists who assume that responses to eco-
nomic incentives will be the same everywhere. This was not the case, he argued, 
because behavioural norms may prevent individuals from responding rationally 
to economic incentives. He called these patterns of behaviour ‘institutions’, and in 
India, Myrdal’s main case study, the regressive institutions he identified included 
the caste system, the taboo on cow slaughter, dysfunctional pre-capitalist struc-
tures of land rights, and the management of firms based on caste, family, and 
ethnic allegiances. What Myrdal describes as institutions include what we would 
today call formal institutions like property rights or laws against cow slaughter, as 
well as informal institutions like caste, that are either self-enforced or enforced by 
informal extra-legal processes (North 1990).
Myrdal’s argument was that formal and informal institutions reinforce each 
other and are therefore difficult to change. Their persistence can prevent the 
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emergence of the behavioural patterns necessary for a modern market economy, 
including efficiency, diligence, flexibility, enterprise, and even honesty. He con-
cluded that regressive behavioural regularities needed to change, but this was 
only likely if compulsion was used to change these attitudes. But the ‘soft’ South 
Asian states were unable or unwilling to impose any social discipline on citizens 
(Myrdal 1968: 60–3). His response was to propose a big push to change institu-
tions and attitudes because ‘[i]t is often not more difficult, but easier, to cause a 
big change rapidly than a small change gradually’ (Myrdal 1968: 115). But he did 
not make clear where he thought such a push would come from.
Figure 13.1 summarizes the links in Myrdal’s analysis. The parallels with the 
later institutional economics of North and his followers are obvious. The argu-
ment begins with formal institutions and informal behavioural norms. In Asia 
these were often regressive, with roots going back to pre-colonial and colonial 
periods, which Myrdal loosely describes as ‘feudal’. These pre-existing institutions 
include dysfunctional property rights over land, hierarchical caste systems, or 
other social attitudes that were inimical to the effective operation of a capitalist 
market economy. Individuals and firms could not respond flexibly to price signals 
or market opportunities in such a context. To deal with the economic underper-
formance that followed, states found it necessary to operate a raft of discretionary 
top-down controls like licensing economic activities, providing subsidies, protect-
ing markets, and so on. The result was the resolution of some problems but the 
creation of new inefficiencies, since these interventions too could not be properly 
policed or enforced. We would today describe this as rent creation and corruption. 
Anticipating subsequent debates over rents, rent-seeking, and governance, Myrdal 
REGRESSIVE INSTITUTIONS
Dysfunctional formal rules and
informal behavioural norms
INEFFICIENT ORGANIZATIONS
Behavioural traits constrain efficiency:
Inflexibility, indiscipline, low responsiveness to
incentives, rule-violation behaviour, dishonesty
FAILED POLICIES
Discretionary policies to correct market
failures induce further corruption and
rule violations: regressive norms
reinforced
Figure 13.1 Myrdal’s institutional analysis.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Myrdal (1968: 901–35).
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argued that these interventions created ‘extraordinarily high profits’ (rents) for 
privileged companies in the private sector (Myrdal 1968: 926). Given the low 
social discipline, the interventions induced further rule violations and regressive 
behaviour, completing the loop in Figure 13.1 (Myrdal 1968: 901–35).
Myrdal’s analysis anticipated modern institutional analysis whose logical 
structure is quite similar. It also anticipated the literature on how corrections to 
market failures can lead to government failures (Bhagwati 1982, 1983; Krueger 
1990). Myrdal sometimes argues that regressive institutions persisted because 
powerful interests benefitted from them, but at other times he argues that they 
reflected the values and cultures of these societies. In the early part of his work, it 
appears that regressive institutions are protected by powerful interests. But later 
Myrdal argues that gradual changes were possible in Europe because reforms 
were aligned with the values of Western civilization, while in South Asia, regressive 
social behaviour, stratification, and attitudes were sanctioned by old cultures and 
popular religion, and so gradual reform was more likely to be overturned (Myrdal 
1968: 2114–15).
The distinction between the two positions is important for Myrdal’s justifica-
tion of radical change. If regressive behaviour is embedded in rigid mental  models 
of large numbers of people, there may be no alternative to radical cultural revolu-
tions to break down these ways of thinking. But if the resistance comes from the 
powerful, attempts at big changes are likely to be violently resisted and incremen-
tal reform strategies may in any case work better. For instance, the resistance of 
different elites may be better dealt with using sequential reforms, or by working in 
alignment with the interests of some of the powerful to achieve greater productiv-
ity and welfare gradually.
The interests of the powerful and the evolution of cultures can clearly interact. 
Powerful groups can be expected to invest in cultures that support their interests, 
but these can also become widely shared and provide affirmation and identity to 
many other groups. A wide range of groups can then use cultural and identity 
symbols in their own mobilizations. It may therefore appear that culture has an 
independent existence because it does not mechanically reflect the interests of 
particular groups. Nevertheless, culture persists because a variety of groups invest 
in its reproduction and it is therefore important to assess the dominant direction 
of causality over time. Myrdal’s earlier argument that regressive institutions and 
attitudes are protected by configurations of interests is more in line with my own 
thinking and with the evidence discussed in section 4. If on the other hand, cul-
tures and norms persist entirely independently because of mental models, we are 
in a thicker soup. Much later, Douglass North came to a similar impasse when he 
was trying to explain the persistence of dysfunctional institutions. North resisted 
explanations based on the distribution of power, and so he had to fall back on 
mental models to explain institutional stagnation by a process of exclusion (North 
1995). The problem is that this can easily descend into a genetic explanation 
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because we then have to explain why some population groups fail to update or 
reject their dysfunctional mental models in the light of evidence. Fortunately, 
North abandoned this line of argument before it drove him in that direction.
This is not to say that values, cultures, or religions never have independent 
effects on the evolution of institutions and organizations. Cultures and norms can 
influence how different groups across society identify themselves and the narra-
tives they use to mobilize their supporters in conflicts with other groups. As a 
result, the evolution of organizational power and institutions can be affected by 
culture and history. Myrdal’s warnings about the regressive role of culture and 
religion can hardly be ignored in the context of the backward slide towards 
 populism and identity politics in large parts of contemporary South Asia and 
beyond. Even so, the question remains as to whether progress requires substantial 
social upheavals to destroy these ideological frames or whether incremental strat-
egies can change evolutionary institutional paths. If institutions and policies can 
be designed to be effective in particular power configurations, and if they support 
the development of new productive capabilities, the distribution of power can 
gradually change and allow new groups to invest in the propagation of new cul-
tures and attitudes. We will return to these questions.
The questions Myrdal raised became the subject of a vast outpouring of research 
in institutional economics and political economy. Liberal rent-seeking analyses 
drew on the work of Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) to argue that liberaliza-
tion was required to reverse discretionary policy interventions of the type that 
Myrdal had described. This, it was argued, would reduce rent-seeking and cor-
ruption and make economies more efficient. The work of North and his associates 
(North 1981, 1990; North et al. 2007; North et al. 2009; North et al. 2013) and 
later of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) identified the formal and informal insti-
tutions that supported efficiency (essentially institutions that made market trans-
actions more efficient) and the ‘extractive’ or redistributive ones that destroyed 
value. The role of political power found a place in mainstream institutional analysis 
in the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2012).
But the emerging analysis suffered from many of the limitations of Myrdal’s 
original work. The emerging work on rents and rent-seeking ignored the rents cre-
ated by welfare-enhancing state interventions. If we recognize the possibility of 
value-enhancing rents, rent-seeking and corruption can be associated with very dif-
ferent development outcomes (Khan 2000a, 2000b, 2006). Similarly, the mainstream 
work on property rights and formal institutions ignored the fact that capitalist 
development requires the destruction of many pre-existing rights and institutions. 
Developing societies are unlikely to have well-enforced formal institutions when 
their pre-existing rights are going through huge disruptions. Using the institutions 
and governance structures of advanced countries as the benchmark for developing 
countries is therefore deeply problematic not only in Myrdal, but also in later 
authors like Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Khan 2012).
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Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000, 2012) analysis of power, and their argument 
that inclusive political institutions empower market-supporting groups, is also 
based on an inappropriate generalization. Advanced countries are advanced 
because they have many productive organizations that can benefit from market 
institutions. Market-restricting monopolies benefit small groups but hurt the 
majority. Inclusive political institutions in such a context can plausibly empower 
the productive majority to resist monopolists. The problem of power is more 
complex in developing countries where the majority may not necessarily support 
market institutions because they do not yet have the productive capabilities to 
benefit from them. Instead, large groups can be mobilized with populist or iden-
tity politics to demand value-reducing rents or to block the productive restruc-
turing of property rights. In these contexts, inclusive political institutions do not 
necessarily empower market-supporting groups. This is not an argument against 
inclusive politics, because restricting rent-seeking opportunities in these contexts 
may sometimes trigger violence and more regressive results. The challenge is to 
devise incremental institutional changes that can nudge developing societies 
towards better evolutionary paths.
3.  Political Settlements and Institutional Evolution
Given these limitations, it is not surprising that Myrdal and the new institutional 
economists who followed could not provide convincing explanations for differ-
ences in performance across developing countries. The high-growth countries in 
Asia did not have the cultures and values of Western capitalist societies, they did 
not have well-enforced formal institutions during their transitions, and they 
did not have very inclusive political institutions. And yet they achieved dramatic 
capitalist transitions. Moreover, from the 1980s, there were significant growth 
accelerations in South Asia as well, without the massive disruptions in cultures 
and attitudes that Myrdal thought would be required.
The ‘political settlements’ framework addresses this challenge and provides a 
different analysis of institutions. It builds on three analytical propositions. First, 
the effectiveness of any institution depends on the responses of the organizations 
affected by that institution. The horizontal activity of organizations in punishing 
or isolating rule-violators is at least as important in ensuring adherence as the 
occasional vertical enforcement by the state. Second, as any institution implies 
different costs and benefits across organizations, some organizations may support 
the institution while others resist it. The overall adherence to, or enforcement of, 
an institution will therefore depend on the distribution of power across different 
types of organizations (the political settlement). Finally, apart from market- 
supporting institutions (like property rights) a range of other institutions is required 
to address market failures and maintain political stability. During periods of crisis 
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or rapid transformations, institutions are also involved in organizing changes in 
rights and creating new capabilities. The operation of ‘transformative’ institutions 
can be decisive, particularly in these contexts. The political settlements frame-
work uses these propositions to provide an alternative analysis of institutional 
performance and policy (Khan 2010, 2018).
The role of organizations in enforcing institutions was highlighted in the work 
of Greif (2006). He used a game-theoretic approach to describe how institutions 
can endogenously emerge in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Institutions for 
Greif were simply the equilibrium behaviour of organizations. The formal specifi-
cation of an institution was therefore less important than the actual behaviour of 
organizations in adhering to particular rules and enforcing them on each other. 
An implication of this approach, though Greif did not put it like that, is that if 
equilibrium behaviour diverged from the description of a formal rule, it would 
appear that the formal rule was being distorted or modified by the behaviour of 
organizations. His models did not consider the distribution of power across 
organizations, but in games with multiple equilibria with different distributions 
of benefits, powerful organizations can be expected to hold out in distributive 
conflicts until the equilibrium behaviour of other organizations adjusts to support 
the institution desired by the more powerful (Knight 1992). This takes us to our 
second proposition. The behavioural regularities that emerge will depend not just 
on particular punishment strategies, but also on the relative holding power of the 
organizations involved.
Marxist historians of capitalist transitions in Europe have also identified the 
importance of distributions of power for understanding the emergence and 
effectiveness of institutions (Brenner 1976, 1985; Wood 2002). The puzzle they 
addressed was that the first transition to capitalism was in England rather than in 
more commercialized or more culturally sophisticated parts of Europe. The 
Italian city states, the Baltic states, or the Netherlands were more commercialized 
centres of long-distance trade. The Renaissance was centred in continental Europe. 
England’s advantage could not have been its more advanced culture or its market 
institutions. Rather, these theorists argued, the first capitalist transformation in 
England was the outcome of a fortuitous balance of power between peasants, 
lords, and monarchs that allowed lords to enclose the commons, yet prevented 
them from reducing the peasantry to serfdom as in Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The Enclosures gradually privatized common village lands over several centuries, 
but allowed richer peasants to become capitalist tenant farmers by leasing land 
from enclosing landlords. This created a landless proletariat and capitalist farmers, 
but also new inequalities which, far from being aligned with ‘Western values’, 
were strongly resisted by the Church (Tawney 1938). Nevertheless, the emergent 
agrarian capitalism drove innovation and productivity growth. Intense competi-
tion between capitalist farmers who had to raise productivity to pay rising rents 
to landlords led both to the development of technology and the imposition of 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/08/19, SPi
Mushtaq H. Khan 329
discipline on workers who adhered to new rules because being landless they had 
no exit options.
The configuration of power was therefore critical for the English transformation, 
rather than a hard state or specific cultures and values, though cultural and other 
factors may have played some role. Similar institutions did not emerge in much of 
Europe till military competition with Britain persuaded Bismarck, Napoleon, 
and other state leaders to organize political coalitions to push through institutional 
transformations from above that achieved capitalist transitions. Similar state-led 
transitions began in Asia with the Meiji revolution in Japan in the nineteenth 
century, which foreshadowed transitions in Taiwan and South Korea in the 
twentieth. In each case, the transition was driven by different types of state and 
non-state organizations but, in all cases, a specific distribution of organizational 
power enabled outcomes that led to the emergence of new institutions and more 
dynamic societies. These institutional changes were mostly gradual rather than 
revolutionary breaks with pre-existing cultures and norms, though the latter 
changed over time as production systems and power configurations changed.
In every case, there was resistance from losers, but the losers were typically 
not the small groups of privileged monopolists, as in Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
analysis. The resistance to the Enclosures in Britain came from peasants. Far from 
inclusive institutions assisting the majority, the dispossessed peasants could not 
block these changes because parliament was not inclusive enough. Representation 
was restricted to property owners. Nor did parliament play a role in ensuring that 
peasants were rapidly or fairly compensated. They were not compensated at all. 
Parliament therefore played no direct role in the institutional transformation. The 
transition was successful because landlords could expropriate common lands 
without much peasant resistance, but they could not expropriate the peasant’s 
own land because peasants had sufficient collective power at the village level. This 
fine balance of power ensured a capitalist transformation of agriculture that 
eventually led to an improvement in welfare across classes. The configuration of 
organizational power and political institutions mattered, but in more complex 
ways than Acemoglu and Robinson suggest.
Finally, a large heterodox literature has discussed the role of institutions in 
addressing market failures and transforming rights and capabilities during social 
transformations. The diversity of outcomes can be examined through the lens of 
rents and the management of rents (Stiglitz  1996; Khan  2000a,  2000b,  2004). 
Rents can be defined in a number of ways, but they usually refer to incremental 
incomes associated with specific institutions. Some institutional changes, like 
the creation of artificial monopolies, create rents that are socially damaging. But 
welfare-enhancing interventions that create or reallocate property rights or 
address market failures also create incremental incomes somewhere. What types 
of rents are created and how they are allocated and managed can serve as a use-
ful lens for assessing the rent-creating institutions. Dynamic societies have 
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institutions that allow growth-enhancing transformations of rights and the creation 
and management of rents that drive learning, innovation, and political stability. 
Less dynamic societies mismanage rents, allowing some groups to capture assets 
and rents without delivering results, or they create rents that are directly unpro-
ductive, like monopoly rents or conflict-inducing redistributive rents.
Since all institutional changes create new incomes, they inevitably create rents. 
Not surprisingly, the emergence of institutions is usually driven by rent-seeking 
and they create incentives for further rent-seeking. Outcomes depend on the 
institutions regulating rent-seeking and the distribution of power across relevant 
organizations. Rent-seeking can result in the creation of socially useful institu-
tions, distortions in the implementation of useful institutions, or the creation of 
damaging institutions (Khan 2000b). Rent-seeking is just as ubiquitous in advanced 
countries but the adherence to a rule of law means that rent-seeking processes 
here are generally rule-following and part of ‘normal’ politics. However, legality 
does not ensure good social outcomes, and the converse is also true. Both legal 
rent-seeking (like lobbying) and illegal variants (like bribing and patron–client 
politics) can be associated with socially damaging, less damaging, or beneficial 
institutional outcomes.
In developing countries, powerful organizations typically do not support a 
rule of law. This is because even organizations that are not predatory are often 
not productive enough to survive against more productive competitors else-
where without informal rents. And because they are few in number, they can 
also transact with each other using informal contract enforcement, without a 
rule of law. Adherence to a rule of law by the powerful is therefore unlikely in 
these contexts and rent-seeking, too, is likely to be illegal or extra-legal, often 
taking the form of corruption. Politics is therefore likely to have a rule-violating 
character. Low tax revenues also mean that promises to spend the budget in 
rule-following ways are unlikely to attract powerful organizations to support 
particular parties. These characteristics of developing-country rent-seeking can 
explain why patronage and political corruption are typically part of their ‘nor-
mal’ politics (Khan 2005).
Given the nature of rent-seeking in these countries, it is not surprising that 
developing countries, including successful ones, typically suffer from high levels 
of corruption. South Korea in the 1960s or China in the 1980s had significant 
levels of corruption and yet achieved rapid development. Myrdal’s analysis of 
corruption and later mainstream analysis does not address this challenge. The 
variations in the outcomes of corruption become explicable once we recognize 
that the real differences between countries are in the types of rents created by 
organizations and how they are managed by other organizations. Where the condi-
tions of allocating and withdrawing rents support productivity growth, desirable 
results can be achieved despite rent-seeking. Corruption declines over time in 
these countries as productive capabilities develop and the growth in the number of 
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productive organizations creates growing organizational support for formalization 
and rule-following behaviour (Khan 2005, 2006).
The management of industrial and technology policies allows us to examine 
the significance of the distribution of power for the management of rents. 
Developing-country firms typically have low initial capabilities. Myrdal recog-
nized the critical importance of learning-by-doing, a process later analysed by 
Amsden (1989) and others. Developing countries do not have to invent new 
technologies; they can just learn how to use existing ones (Myrdal 1968: 691–6). 
However, market failures may prevent investments in learning-by-doing, a 
problem Myrdal did not adequately recognize. Amsden (1989) argued that 
learning needed to be supported by targeting conditional rents to emerging 
business, but the latter also had to be disciplined, and rents sometimes withdrawn 
to ensure that these were not wasted.
Evans (1995) later contributed the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ to explain 
why intervention by strong East Asian states achieved productivity growth rather 
than rent extraction. These states had the power to extract resources from business, 
but they used their power to raise productivity instead. Evans argued that this 
happened because government agencies were embedded in dense business–
government networks that allowed the knowledge and interests of the business 
sector to be incorporated into policy.
While developmental state theorists provided a deeper analysis of institutions 
and rents and went beyond the focus on market institutions, their analysis was 
still largely a purely institutional one. They ignored the configurations of power 
that enabled some institutions to work in specific contexts but not others. The 
rent-granting and rent-withdrawal institutions that Amsden and others identified 
in East Asia existed in similar forms in South Asia where they achieved far less 
impressive results. South Asian states had sufficient autonomy to destroy or con-
strain many good businesses, but they did not discipline the bad ones. Similarly, 
dense networks between business and government in South Asia and sometimes 
in Southeast Asia resulted in crony capitalism rather than efficiency-enhancing 
information sharing. The differences between these cases cannot be understood 
by looking at institutional structure alone, we need to understand how specific con-
figurations of organizational power made similar institutions operate differently.
Figure 13.2 summarizes our distinction between a ‘pure institutional analysis’, 
which focuses on the incentives created by formal and informal institutions that 
may result in particular outcomes, and the political settlements extension, which 
looks in addition at how the specific distribution of power across organizations 
affects the actual adherence to and enforcement of these institutions. Note that 
the introduction of particular institutions and policies on the left-hand side is not 
entirely predetermined by existing power structures. Otherwise, societies would 
be completely trapped by the interests of those who are already powerful. There is 
always some policy space for the introduction of new institutions and policies 
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that innovative political leaderships or organizations can exploit, but their imple-
mentation and final effects do depend on the reaction of a broader range of 
organizations.
The distribution of power across organizations is the ‘political settlement’ at 
the top right-hand corner of Figure  13.2. This describes the holding power of 
organizations affected by a particular institution. The country and sector-specific 
configurations of organizational power can only be inferred from a reading of 
history, which is why institutional analysis cannot be generalized from particular 
cases or derived from first principles. Holding power is not just based on the eco-
nomic power of organizations but also on their organizational power to hold out 
in conflicts while inflicting costs on others. Ignoring the power and interests of 
organizations is one reason why pure institutional analysis remains deficient, 
both the mainstream variants focusing on market institutions and heterodox 
variants looking at transformative institutions. Every institution or policy has dis-
tributive implications, and organizations can be expected to support or resist 
their implementation. If institutions create rents or seek to manage rents in ways 
that are against the interests of powerful organizations, the latter will resist by 
trying to change the institution or to informally modify its implementation using 
corruption or informal violations. Fully effective adherence is a boundary case. 
Note that informal modifications here have little to do with norms and every-
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Heterodox variants focus on ‘transformative’
institutions that can transform production structures
Figure 13.2 Political settlements and institutional outcomes.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Khan (2010, 2018).
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distribution of power. Actual economic outcomes depend on how particular 
institutions or policies are implemented, not just their theoretical effects. Figure 13.2 
also shows that the political settlement is itself affected by economic outcomes 
which change the distribution of power over time. It is this evolutionary dynamic 
that a historical analysis of institutions must attempt to capture.
Depending on how the outcomes of particular policies and institutions affect 
the development of organizations, the relative power of organizations will evolve 
in particular ways. Radical change from this perspective is only necessary if the 
existing political settlement allows no incremental improvements in outcomes. 
The radical change in question would involve political mobilizations and the 
creation of new organizations that sought to directly change the political settle-
ment at the top right-hand corner of Figure 13.2. The danger is that mobilizations 
on this scale can just as well trigger counter-mobilizations of even more regres-
sive coalitions, while incrementalism may actually result in more sustainable pro-
gressive changes in the political settlement over time.
4. Comparative Institutional Experiences
The analytical links described in Figure 13.2 can help to make sense of compari-
sons between North East Asian and South Asian experiences in the 1960s, the 
period that Myrdal looked at. They can also help us to understand institutional 
evolution since that time. South Korea began its industrial take-off shortly after 
Park Chung Hee took power in a military coup in 1961. By then South Korea had 
already carried out substantial land reforms as the Japanese occupation had force-
fully dispossessed the most powerful elements of the Korean yangban landed 
elite and converted much of their land to Japanese ownership. With the departure 
of the Japanese, land reform based on the redistribution of Japanese land and the 
compulsory purchase of land from the remaining landlords was relatively easy to 
achieve. These reforms led to a significant equalization of landholdings and a dra-
matic reduction in the number of tenants as they became smallholders. However, 
it did not create a class of yeoman tenants on the English pattern who could drive 
an agrarian capitalist revolution from below. The global conditions were not right 
for smallholding agriculture to make much of an impact on South Korea’s economic 
progress. At best, the land reform created political stability in the countryside in 
the face of the communist threat from the North, expanded the domestic market 
somewhat, and perhaps created a greater demand for education in the country-
side (Kohli 1994; Putzel 2000).
The real impetus to South Korean modernization came with its industrial 
push in the 1960s. A critical feature of the new institutional structure was the 
provision of significant rents to the chaebol (the large family-owned conglomer-
ates of South Korea), to enable them to engage in learning-by-doing to improve 
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their organizational and technical capabilities (Amsden 1989; Khan 2000b). The 
institutions supporting their learning also compelled the chaebol to rapidly acquire 
international competitiveness by withdrawing support if they failed to perform. 
The credibility of the withdrawal threat created compulsions for rapid productivity 
growth and ensured that infants did not require permanent support. Myrdal’s fear 
that unproductive rent capture would compound the problems that any interven-
tions tried to solve did not materialize in South Korea.
Why did South Korea not fall into this trap? Pakistan provides a good com-
parison with South Korea because it attempted a similar mix of import substitu-
tion and export promotion, and provided rents to large holding companies using 
similar instruments (Khan 1999). Indeed, in the early years, South Korean planners 
came to Pakistan to learn about planning strategies. While there were many differ-
ences between the two countries, the decisive difference was that large Pakistani 
companies were connected to powerful and dense networks within the bureau-
cracy, army, and political parties, and could use their help to successfully retain 
rents even when their failure to become competitive had become obvious.
The organization of patronage networks in Pakistan was fragmented, but each 
network was powerful enough to resist disciplining by others or by state agencies. 
In the late 1960s, the media openly reported how ‘twenty-two families’ had cap-
tured public resources, but the military regime was unable to impose discipline 
on its inefficient clients. There was much corruption in this process, as Myrdal 
recognized, but it was more than just a problem of corruption. The value-reducing 
rent capture by powerful networks hurt the legitimacy of the ostensibly powerful 
military government. It tried unsuccessfully to rein in its clients, including revealing 
their names and the money they owed, but it failed. The regime was eventually 
brought down in 1971 as a result of popular mobilizations against cronyistic elites. 
The failure was deeper than knowledge, values, or interests. The top leadership 
had strong incentives to limit rent capture by uncompetitive business groups but 
they failed to overcome their resistance. The nature of the failure suggests that a 
different policy design, perhaps supporting smaller, less-connected capitalists, or 
rewarding investors after they had achieved some results rather than giving all the 
rents upfront, may have worked better in this political settlement. Indeed, we find 
that other strategies of supporting learning worked much better in a number of 
sectors in South Asia in the 1980s.
We know as a result of later revelations by the chaebol that the allocation of 
industrial policy rents in South Korea in the 1960s involved much corruption. 
But, here, corruption did not featherbed inefficiency. The chaebol receiving support 
knew they had an opportunity to become competitive, but they also knew that the 
option of capturing the rents while remaining uncompetitive was not feasible. This 
was because the state agencies monitoring them were more powerful than the 
networks that individual businesses could mobilize. The agencies figured out that 
their formal and informal payoffs would be higher if they reallocated rents to 
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chaebol that could grow and generate additional profits rather than inefficient 
ones that could not. Corruption still happened, but here it was of a profit-sharing 
type. The chaebol needed the support of the state, and they were willing to treat 
the political leadership as informal business partners who could claim a share of 
profits as ‘dividends’. The logic was simple, and both sides soon worked out that 
profit-sharing corruption was not only not contrary to productivity growth, 
given the distribution of power, it created incentives and compulsions to achieve 
productivity growth. The rent allocation rules could not be distorted because 
critical agencies had the interest and the power to prevent it (Khan 1998, 2000b).
Where did this capacity come from? It is hard to argue that contemporary 
South Korea had a culture with attitudes of rationality and discipline that were 
significantly superior to South Asia. True, it had a more developed industrial 
history as a result of Japanese colonialism, but this cannot explain why inefficient 
firms were not allowed to capture rents. The capacity to withdraw rents and 
discipline the chaebol is more plausibly explained by a specific political settlement. 
The historical roots of this can be traced back at least to the impact of Japanese 
colonialism. The latter was brutal, but it did not create a fragmented and competi-
tive set of political organizations in its colonies, as the divide-and-rule strategies 
of British colonialism created in South Asia and elsewhere. The post-war South 
Korean political settlement was marked by an absence of powerful competitive 
networks within the state and bureaucracy, so individual chaebol could not collude 
and share rents with parts of the network to prevent themselves being disciplined 
by other parts.
When the South Korean state began its industrialization drive, its leaders did 
not have pre-conceived ideas about how to make rent allocation achieve dynamic 
results. Rather, trial and error revealed that making support to a chaebol condi-
tional on the achievement of export targets resulted in rapid productivity growth 
because the rule could be enforced. The chaebol put in lots of effort to raise 
 productivity, knowing that the alternative would be disastrous for them. Once the 
enforceability of these rules became known, the system evolved in a particular 
direction, with more ambitious learning strategies emerging. In contexts where 
state support could be combined with rules that compelled companies to achieve 
productivity growth, similar types of corrupt but ‘efficient’ profit sharing emerged 
in a number of Asian countries, including China in the 1980s.
Trial and error revealed a very different political settlement to South Asian 
state leaders. Leaders in Pakistan and India were soon aware that industrial policy 
rents were being unproductively captured and though this was not in their inter-
est they failed to discipline their clients. While individual bureaucrats and politi-
cians benefitted, the higher-level leaderships lost out in terms of overall revenue 
and legitimacy. Individual businesses constructed alliances with powerful 
 political and bureaucratic networks that undermined any possibility of disciplin-
ing them. The failure to govern rents was ultimately not due to flawed mental 
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models but rather a configuration of power that made it impossible to impose 
discipline on these firms.
In India, Myrdal argued that productivity growth was not even an explicit goal 
of import protection, the latter was justified simply by the need to conserve 
foreign exchange (Myrdal 1968: 1158). This is not true. Using protection as a rent 
allocation instrument to develop domestic productive capabilities was a demand 
of the nationalist movement, and it was supported by emerging Indian capital in 
the Bombay Plan of 1944. Moreover, the failings of the industrial licensing system 
were of great concern to the Indian state (Chakravarty 1987). However, when state 
leaders discovered that efficiency could not be achieved, they would occasionally 
justify their policies by saying this was not even their intention.
We know from the report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee 
(Dutt 1969) that Indian policymakers were painfully aware that businesses they 
supported were not meeting their licence conditions and instead using their 
licences to behave like monopolies. The Dutt Committee recommended sanctions 
on business houses that failed to comply with licence conditions, but this was not 
implemented. As in Pakistan, the problem was clearly neither ignorance nor the 
interests of state leaders. Rather, the peak agencies that wanted to achieve 
 productivity growth were weak relative to the powerful networks below them 
who saw greater benefit in capturing rents without delivering results and using 
the rents to sustain their power through patronage networks. The distribution of 
power was the real source of this prisoner’s dilemma outcome, while the ability of 
political leaderships in developmental states to discipline free riders allowed the 
pie to increase for everybody. Institutions and institutional outcomes reflected 
the political settlement rather than values or norms.
We turn now to Myrdal’s analysis of the soft state. It is true that planning agen-
cies in South Asia could not discipline businesses protected by political entrepre-
neurs from the intermediate and upper classes and their clientelist networks. But 
other state agencies were able to discipline subaltern classes or regional separatist 
movements. In these conflicts, states in India and Pakistan were ready to use 
overwhelming force to ‘discipline’ segments of their societies. The enforcement 
problem was therefore limited to specific sectors and institutions rather than 
being a general malaise of social indiscipline. The specific instruments that were 
used, particularly for promoting industrial development, had governance and 
disciplining requirements for specific organizations that could not be adequately 
enforced. The implication is that other institutions and instruments allocating rents 
to a different set of organizations may have achieved better development results.
This insight can help to explain the significant growth accelerations in a few 
sectors in India and Bangladesh in the 1980s with relatively minor institutional 
and policy innovations. The previous industrial policy had achieved output growth 
in many sectors, but productivity growth was low because of poor disciplining. As 
a result, competitiveness was typically not achieved in most sectors (Acharya 
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et al. 2003: table 2.2; Virmani 2004: table 1; Bosworth et al. 2007: table 3). The 
growing economic openness from the 1980s helped imports of capital and 
machinery, which supported productivity growth. But the achievement of com-
petitiveness also required policies that assisted learning and capability development. 
What is interesting is that relatively minor institutional and policy innovations 
created the compulsions for productivity growth that were previously missing.
The new policy and institutional innovations in a few sectors were successful 
because rents were delivered to organizations that did not have the power to 
protect them unconditionally. Conditions could be credibly enforced that would 
hurt the firms if they failed to deliver results. An important feature in several of 
these take-offs was that investors were induced to first invest their own resources 
in learning, with policy promising sufficient ex post rents to give a high return on 
their risky investments if they succeeded.
I have discussed these examples at greater length elsewhere; they included 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals in India and garments and textiles in Bangladesh, 
sectors that drove growth accelerations in these countries from the 1980s onwards 
(Khan  2011,  2013a,  2013c). The cases are different, but we can summarize the 
Bangladeshi garments and Indian automobiles cases to illustrate their common 
features. In these two cases ex post rewards were created for a foreign partner to 
transfer capabilities to domestic firms. In a third sector, Indian pharmaceuticals, 
the story was slightly different. Here ex post rents were created for domestic 
firms if they succeeded in developing manufacturing capabilities by backward 
engineering based on the application of the Indian Patent Act of 1970. But all 
these sectors were similar in rewarding successful capability development ex post 
as a way of encouraging prior private investments and being successful in the 
implementation of these rules.
In the Bangladesh garments sector, the critical instrument was an agreement in 
1979 between a Bangladeshi company, Desh, and a South Korean company, 
Daewoo, backed by the Bangladeshi state. The context was the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement of 1974, which created potential ex post rents for least-developed 
countries like Bangladesh if they could achieve sufficient quality and competitive-
ness to sell garments in the quota-protected US market. The protection created 
quota rents in the US market, and the agreement was to pass on the potential 
quota rents to Daewoo as its reward for transferring export capability to Desh 
(Khan 2013b). The rule essentially transferred a percentage of future sales revenue 
to Daewoo, and this was sufficiently rewarding for it to invest in capability transfer. 
What made the rule easy to enforce was that unless Desh acquired the capability 
to export, no one would make any money. No ex ante rents were allocated to 
powerful businesses in Bangladesh, so there was no possibility of capturing these 
rents. The rule for transferring quota rents to Daewoo was also credible because 
the Bangladeshi state could prevent a relatively small firm from violating a contract 
that the President saw as vital for the country.
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This combination of credible ex post rents for Daewoo and compulsions for 
investors to recover their investments resulted in dramatic capability development. 
Desh became a competitive firm within months of sending an army of super-
visors to South Korea to learn factory and supply chain organization. As the 
organizational design that it adapted was appropriate to Bangladeshi conditions 
and could be easily imitated, thousands of Bangladeshi entrepreneurs entered the 
garments industry. The explosive growth of the sector created millions of jobs and 
within two decades Bangladesh had become the second biggest garment producer 
after China, though still far below China in absolute terms.
In the Indian automobile industry, the government signed a joint venture 
agreement in 1982 between Suzuki, a Japanese company, and Maruti, a public 
sector Indian company, allowing Suzuki to sell in the highly protected Indian 
market if it could produce an Indian car with sixty per cent domestic content 
within five years. Given that Indian tier one and two producers already had basic 
technical capabilities, the incentive of capturing significant tariff rents ex post was 
sufficient for Suzuki to invest in developing the capabilities of its Indian suppliers. 
Here, too, the mechanisms of rent allocation were credible to the parties, as was 
the enforceability of the conditions.
Rents could not be captured by Indian components producers because no ex 
ante rents were transferred to them. A failure to achieve international standards 
with Suzuki’s help would simply be a lost opportunity for future profits. Suzuki 
knew that the strong opposition to its operations from domestic automobile and 
machine tools producers meant that a failure to achieve the domestic content 
conditions would result in exclusion from the Indian market. There was no 
question of the capacity of the Indian state to enforce this condition. As Suzuki 
was investing first, it had strong compulsions to succeed as that was the only way 
to capture the ex post tariff rents. Once again capability development was rapid 
and successful, and similar deals with other foreign companies followed. By the 
1990s, India’s auto components industry had become globally competitive. By the 
turn of the century, the sequential upgrading of auto components producers 
enabled India to produce its own branded cars. It became one of the few global 
car producers that could produce globally competitive national brands.
In both these cases incremental institutional and policy changes turned out to 
be enforceable from the perspective of specific developmental goals, given the 
distribution of power across the organizations involved, including relevant gov-
ernance agencies. This is potentially a promising escape from the bind of weak 
enforcement, because it exploits the observation that in most states, enforcement 
failure does not extend to all dimensions. Economic development would be more 
rapid, and strategies of inclusion more effective, if these opportunities were more 
thoroughly exploited. The importance of the appropriate design of policies and 
institutions across different political settlements is insufficiently understood, 
which is why Bangladesh and India have not been able to replicate their own suc-
cesses in many other sectors.
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Looking at South Korean or Taiwanese industrial policy as paradigmatic has 
been very damaging for follower countries. These North East Asian states 
inherited political settlements from Japanese colonial times that were character-
ized by the absence of powerful factional political organizations. These states had 
the capacity to enforce conditions on firms receiving rents because the latter 
could not construct coalitions with powerful factions to protect their rents for a 
price. As politicians and bureaucrats discovered their enforcement capacity, 
sequential improvements in policy design followed. These countries did not have 
the cultural norms of the West, but the gradual productive transformation of their 
societies through the development of capabilities and competitiveness created a 
very similar impetus for investments in education, health, and culture. This took 
them in the direction of modern societies, including a transition from learning to 
innovation societies. With the transition to innovation increasing in pace over the 
last two decades, the dominance of institutions supporting catching up has been 
gradually superseded by institutions supporting innovation. While the achieve-
ments of these ‘developmental states’ have been truly impressive, the institutions 
and policies that they used to achieve development are not replicable in other 
states, even in Asia, where the political settlements are substantially different.
South Asia inherited a very different political settlement. Both democratic and 
authoritarian governments in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh discovered their 
enforcement capabilities were limited when they faced powerful political and 
bureaucratic factions organized by the ‘intermediate classes’. Myrdal described a 
moment in the history of these countries when they were using policy instruments 
that were seriously distorted in their implementation. Subsequent developments 
in the 1980s and beyond show that substantial growth could be achieved with 
policies and institutions allocating rents in other ways, even though these have 
not been developed to their full extent. Nevertheless, the long-run pace of devel-
opment in South Asia is likely to be slower and more uneven than in North East 
Asia. South Asian states do not have the political and institutional capacity to 
support development across a broad range of sectors and regions all at once, as 
these strategies typically require disciplining a broad range of policy rents. 
Moreover, the poor results of bureaucratic management and the involvement of 
politicians and bureaucrats in value-reducing variants of corruption have had 
negative effects on morale. The very best graduates no longer find a career in the 
civil service sufficiently rewarding in most parts of South Asia, and this has had 
negative cumulative effects on bureaucratic capacity.
Southeast Asia has been somewhere in between in terms of the complexity of 
their internal power structures, and therefore in the constraints on enforcement 
set by their political settlements. Over the longer term their success has been 
somewhere in between South and North East Asia. From the perspective of the 
political settlements framework, it is not surprising that we find a great diversity 
of economic strategies and institutions that have worked and failed across these 
countries (Khan 2000b, 2007). Southeast Asian countries, too, have come a long 
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way in the half-century since Myrdal wrote his Asian Drama, and some now face 
new challenges of progressing from learning to innovation societies while dealing 
with emerging challenges of populist politics.
5.  Incremental versus Radical Reform  
and Prospects for the Future
On one critical question, the jury is still out. Myrdal posited that incremental 
changes were not only more painful than radical or revolutionary changes in the 
long run; incremental strategies were also more likely to fail. The case against 
incrementalism that Myrdal posited still affects many variants of modern institutional 
analysis. Acemoglu and Robinson are arguably in the same tradition in ruling out 
the sustainability of growth without a big shift towards inclusive political and 
economic institutions. For Myrdal, incrementalism was an excuse for unproductive 
elites to keep tolerating indiscipline and regressive practices (1968: 1909–10). 
However, neither Myrdal nor Acemoglu and Robinson have a convincing 
explanation of where the big changes will come from. Even if leaderships emerged 
in these countries with very different beliefs and a willingness to unleash 
 discipline on society, or even if the critical junctures that Acemoglu and 
Robinson identify as the prelude for big changes came around (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012: 110–23), there is no guarantee that the radical reform strategies 
that may follow would be sustained over time.
If we are right in arguing that the distribution of power in society is relevant 
for institutional outcomes, attempts by political movements to enforce radical 
changes on the powerful could unleash substantial counter-mobilizations, violence, 
and very high ‘transition costs’ (Khan 1995, 2012). Nor is it clear that incremental 
strategies are more likely to fail if they can be appropriately constructed. What is 
clear is that many of the formal institutional and policy strategies that Myrdal 
looked at did indeed fail in India because their requirements of enforcement and 
adherence were unrealistic. But a leadership that was developmental could have 
followed an incremental strategy that took into account issues of enforcement to 
identify institutions and policies that were more likely to be effective for achieving 
development in that social context.
The elephant in the room for making these comparisons is China, a country 
that Myrdal did not include in his original study and one that Acemoglu and 
Robinson write off as unlikely to succeed given its ‘non-inclusive’ institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 428–46). In fact, China is not only the most dra-
matic developmental transformation in human history, it also went through mas-
sive upheavals and revolutionary changes in the organization of its society. These 
radical changes could have contributed to its success in two quite different ways: 
the upheavals could have destroyed pre-existing regressive cultures and attitudes 
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in Myrdal’s sense, or they could have helped to create a disciplined organization, 
the Communist Party, with a new power structure that was effectively a new 
political settlement. The distinction is important. The cultures and attitudes that 
the communist revolution tried to root out were precisely the individualistic 
profit-seeking attitudes and property rights that were revived after 1979 during 
the growth transformation. One could argue that the upheaval helped to reboot 
pre-existing norms, to make them more appropriate for modern capitalism, but 
surely a less costly route could have been tried. Tens of millions of lives were lost 
or disrupted in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and yet 
many aspects of pre-revolutionary culture survived.
A more compelling case for the potentially positive effects of revolutionary dis-
ruption is that it may have enabled the construction of a relatively disciplined and 
inclusive political organization, the Communist Party, with the political power to 
allocate resources and discipline their use on a scale not possible in other 
developing countries. The Communist Party gradually came to include within it 
almost all of the politically active Chinese population, and it developed formal 
mechanisms for reaching compromises and enforcing agreements on collective 
rent allocation decisions. Decades of conflict and organizational activity were 
necessary to create this political structure but once it had emerged, the enforcement 
of collective decisions about resource and rent allocation was much more 
effective relative to other developing countries. The political settlement that the 
Chinese Communist Party represents may not be a permanently sustainable one, 
nor may it be the most appropriate one for enforcing the new types of rights and 
contracts that will be required as China moves from a learning to an innovation 
society. But it was very effective in organizing the post-1979 economic miracle 
based on adopting and adapting existing technologies and attracting significant 
foreign investments.
While the end results of the revolution were clearly positive, regardless of how 
we explain it, the policy implications are not clear. If the construction of a 
 disciplined and inclusive political organization is the element that explains 
China’s subsequent institutional success, this is by no means assured as an out-
come of an upheaval. Upheavals can destroy pre-existing institutions and organiza-
tions without necessarily leading to the emergence of a disciplined and inclusive 
organization. Massive upheavals are more likely to create unmitigated chaos for 
long periods. The answer to Myrdal’s social discipline and soft state problem may 
be to look much more seriously for incremental answers that take us in the direc-
tion of more organized and disciplined societies. I find very promising the 
 examples of successful sectoral development in Myrdal’s ‘soft states’ in the 1980s 
and beyond. These provide rich but all-too-rare examples of strategies that may 
work to accelerate the social transformation of countries in progressive and inclu-
sive directions. If incremental strategies can be sustained across sectors and 
regions (and that is admittedly a big if), these strategies could gradually result in 
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the multiplication of successful sectors and organizations, which may eventually 
want a better formal enforcement of social rules in general.
The growth and empowerment of powerful productive organizations that will 
eventually demand  the enforcement of rules in their own interest is the only sure 
way of eventually creating an effective demand for a transition to a rule-following 
society. As against this, regressive interests and organizations in these societies 
can also be expected to mount their own rent-seeking and influencing activities. 
We can expect them to try and distort institutions in ways that can be described 
as social indiscipline, corruption, regressive social norms, and impunity. The pace 
of, and prospects for, development are likely to depend on the contest between 
these contending forces.
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